The Federalist Papers
Chapter 81 of 87
  1. Introduction
  2. The Text of the Federalist
  3. I General Introduction
  4. II Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
  5. III The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence)
  6. IV The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence)
  7. V The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence)
  8. VI Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
  9. VII The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)
  10. VIII The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
  11. IX The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
  12. X The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
  13. XI The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
  14. XII The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue
  15. XIII Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
  16. XIV Objections to the Proposed Constitution from Extent of Territory Answered
  17. XV The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
  18. XVI The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
  19. XVII The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
  20. XVIII The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
  21. XIX The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
  22. XX The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
  23. XXI Other Defects of the Present Confederation
  24. XXII The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
  25. XXIII The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
  26. XXIV The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
  27. XXV The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
  28. XXVI The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
  29. XXVII The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
  30. XXVIII The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
  31. XXIX 32 Concerning the Militia
  32. XXX Concerning the General Power of Taxation
  33. XXXI The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  34. XXXII The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  35. XXXIII The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  36. XXXIV The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  37. XXXV The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  38. XXXVI The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
  39. XXXVII Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
  40. XXXVIII The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
  41. XXXIX The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
  42. XL On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
  43. XLI General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
  44. XLII The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
  45. XLIII The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered)
  46. XLIV Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
  47. XLV The Alleged Danger from the Powers of the Union to the State Governments
  48. XLVI The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
  49. XLVII The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
  50. XLVIII These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
  51. XLIX Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
  52. L Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
  53. LI The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
  54. LII The House of Representatives
  55. LIII The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)
  56. LIV The Apportionment of Members Among the States
  57. LV The Total Number of the House of Representatives
  58. LVI The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives)
  59. LVII The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
  60. LVIII Objection That the Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands
  61. LIX Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
  62. LX The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
  63. LXI The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
  64. LXII The Senate
  65. LXIII The Senate Continued
  66. LXIV The Powers of the Senate
  67. LXV The Powers of the Senate Continued
  68. LXVI Objections to the Power of the Senate to Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
  69. LXVII The Executive Department
  70. LXVIII The Mode of Electing the President
  71. LXIX The Real Character of the Executive
  72. LXX The Executive Department Further Considered
  73. LXXI The Duration in Office of the Executive
  74. LXXII The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
  75. LXXIII The Provision for the Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
  76. LXXIV The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
  77. LXXV The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
  78. LXXVI The Appointing Power of the Executive
  79. LXXVII The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
  80. LXXVIII The Judiciary Department
  81. LXXIX The Judiciary Continued
  82. LXXX The Powers of the Judiciary
  83. LXXXI The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
  84. LXXXII The Judiciary Continued
  85. LXXXIII The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
  86. LXXXIV Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered
  87. LXXXV Concluding Remarks
The Federalist Papers · Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay

LXXIX The Judiciary Continued

LXXIX

The Judiciary Continued

Hamilton: From McClean’s Edition, New York, Wednesday, May 28, 1788.

To the People of the State of New York:

Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable here. In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will. And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the latter. The enlightened friends to good government in every state, have seen cause to lament the want of precise and explicit precautions in the state constitutions on this head. Some of these indeed have declared that permanent salaries should be established for the judges; but the experiment has in some instances shown that such expressions are not sufficiently definite to preclude legislative evasions. Something still more positive and unequivocal has been evinced to be requisite. The plan of the convention accordingly has provided that the judges of the United States “shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”

This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible provision that could have been devised. It will readily be understood that the fluctuations in the value of money and in the state of society rendered a fixed rate of compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. What might be extravagant today, might in half a century become penurious and inadequate. It was therefore necessary to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to vary its provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances, yet under such restrictions as to put it out of the power of that body to change the condition of the individual for the worse. A man may then be sure of the ground upon which he stands, and can never be deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in a less eligible situation. The clause which has been quoted combines both advantages. The salaries of judicial officers may from time to time be altered, as occasion shall require, yet so as never to lessen the allowance with which any particular judge comes into office, in respect to him. It will be observed that a difference has been made by the convention between the compensation of the President and of the judges, That of the former can neither be increased nor diminished; that of the latter can only not be diminished. This probably arose from the difference in the duration of the respective offices. As the President is to be elected for no more than four years, it can rarely happen that an adequate salary, fixed at the commencement of that period, will not continue to be such to its end. But with regard to the judges, who, if they behave properly, will be secured in their places for life, it may well happen, especially in the early stages of the government, that a stipend, which would be very sufficient at their first appointment, would become too small in the progress of their service.

This provision for the support of the judges bears every mark of prudence and efficacy; and it may be safely affirmed that, together with the permanent tenure of their offices, it affords a better prospect of their independence than is discoverable in the constitutions of any of the states in regard to their own judges.

The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office, and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.

The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of inability has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible that such a provision would either not be practiced upon or would be more liable to abuse than calculated to answer any good purpose. The mensuration of the faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts. An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to personal and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public good. The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbitrary; and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification.

The constitution of New York, to avoid investigations that must forever be vague and dangerous, has taken a particular age as the criterion of inability. No man can be a judge beyond sixty. I believe there are few at present who do not disapprove of this provision. There is no station, in relation to which it is less proper than to that of a judge. The deliberating and comparing faculties generally preserve their strength much beyond that period in men who survive it; and when, in addition to this circumstance, we consider how few there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor, and how improbable it is that any considerable portion of the bench, whether more or less numerous, should be in such a situation at the same time, we shall be ready to conclude that limitations of this sort have little to recommend them. In a republic, where fortunes are not affluent, and pensions not expedient, the dismission of men from stations in which they have served their country long and usefully, on which they depend for subsistence, and from which it will be too late to resort to any other occupation for a livelihood, ought to have some better apology to humanity than is to be found in the imaginary danger of a superannuated bench.

Publius